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by  J. A. Cacy and Glenn H. Miller, Jr. 
In  discharging  its  responsibility  to  help 
control  inflation  and  promote  a  healthy 
economy, the Federal Reserve System in recent 
years has sought to control the growth  of  the 
nation's  supply  of  money  and  credit.  The 
System,  however,  has  not  always  been 
successful  in  controlling  monetary  growth.  In 
particular,  during  much  of  1979,  the  money 
supply  increased  at a  rapid  pace.  This  rapid 
monetary  growth  was  accompanied  by 
accelerating inflation  and  recurring  weakness 
in the international position of the dollar. 
In response to these developments, and in an 
effort  to slow  monetary  growth,  the  Federal 
Reserve  took  action  at  various  times  during 
1979 to bring about increases in interest rates. 
As  of  the  end  of  September,  though,  these 
efforts  had  not  been  effective  in  bringing 
monetary growth  under  control.  For  this 
reason,  the  Federal  Reserve  introduced 
additional  measures  in  early  October,  one  of 
which  involved  a  change  in  the  System's 
approach  to  monetary  control.  The  Federal 
Reserve  decided  to  focus  on  controlling  the 
availability of money and credit directly, rather 
than controlling money  indirectly  through 
changes in interest rates. 
J.  A.  Cacy  and  Glenn  H.  Miller,  Jr.,  are  both  vice 
presidents and senior economists with  the Federal  Reserve 
Bank of  Kansas Cjty. 
This  article  describes  the  economic  and 
monetary developments  in 1979 that led  up to 
the  monetary  policy  measures  instituted  on 
October 6. An analysis of the Federal Reserve's 
new  approach  to  monetary  control  is  then 
presented.  Following  that  analysis,  the 
economic  and  financial  outlook  for  1980  is 
discussed. 
ECONOMIC CONDITIONS IN 1979 
Following  the  recession  of  1974-75,  the 
United  States embarked  on  an economic 
expansion  that  became,  during  1978,  the 
second longest in the nation's  post-World War 
I1  history.  The expansion  was  propelled 
primarily  by  vigorous  growth  in  consumer 
spending and  residential construction  activity, 
with  business  spending  for  new  plants  and 
equipment  contributing  more  strongly  as the 
expansion matured. The balanced performance 
of the private domestic economy was  rounded 
out by well-controlled growth in inventories,  as 
businessmen  kept  their  stocks  of  goods  and 
materials  in  close  check.  As  the  expansion 
proceeded, however,  accelerating inflation 
tended  to overshadow  the balanced  nature of 
improving  economic  activity.  In  1978,  the 
increase in the general price level was-with the 
exception of 1974--the largest in 30 years. 
During 1978,  the influence  of  inflation  and 
the dynamics  of  the  business  cycle  led  many 
Economic Review  December 1979 observers  to believe that the expansion  period 
was drawing to a close and that a downturn was 
imminent. Yet, in the fourth quarter, total real 
output  grew  strongly,  buoyed  by  robust 
spending on final purchases by both businesses 
and  consumers.  Thus,  as  1979  opened, 
expectations for at least  a general weakness in 
economic  activity, if  not  an actual  downturn, 
had not yet been realized. 
Economic Activity 
Weakness in  economic  activity did, though, 
appear in the first quarter of 1979,  when total 
real  output grew  at only a 1 per  cent  annual 
rate.  All  of  that  small  increase  was  in  final 
sales,  as  inventory  investment  remained 
unchanged  from  the  fourth  quarter.  Personal 
consumption  spending  was  weak,  real 
residential construction spending declined 
substantially,  and  government  purchases  fell 
slightly,  leaving only business fixed investment 
and  net  exports  as  contributors  to total  real 
output growth in the year's first quarter. 
The  second  quarter  of  1979  brought  a 
temporary cessation of  the expansion,  as  real 
GNP dropped  at a  2.3 per cent  annual  rate. 
Only in retrospect will it be known whether that 
decline  marked  the beginning  of  a  recession. 
Nevertheless,  a  general downturn in economic 
activity did occur, with real final sales falling in 
every  major  spending  sector  of  the economy 
with  the sole exception  of  purchases by  state 
and local governments.  As  a result, total final 
sales fell  by  about 4 per cent. The difference 
between the declines in  final  sales  and in  real 
GNP was accounted  for by  a fairly substantial 
increase in business inventory  investment, 
largely  involuntary  in  nature  because  of  the 
drop-off in sales. 
If  the  nation  was  not  yet  in a  recession  at 
midyear,  expectations  of  its  imminent 
appearance  were  strengthened  by  the 
economy's  performance  in  the  first  half  of 
1979.  But  the  ambiguities  of  economic 
experience in the 1970s reasserted themselves in 
the third quarter of the year:  total real output 
resumed  its  upward  movement  at an  annual 
rate of 3.5 per cent. Real final sales rebounded 
sharply to grow  nearly twice as rapidly as real 
GNP,  an  increase  partly  offset  by  a  much 
reduced  rate of inventory accumulation.  In the 
third quarter, the earlier decline in real govern- 
ment purchases ceased, the decline in  resident- 
ial construction  spending slowed,  and business 
fixed  investment  spending  increased  substan- 
tially. Most important, however, was the come- 
back  of  the  consumer  after  two  quarters  of 
nonspending  behavior.  In  spite  of  a  further 
drop in real disposable income, consumer pur- 
chases  of  both  goods  and  services  rose 
markedly. This performance was accomplished 
by  means of a reduction of  the personal saving 
rate to its lowest level in  more than 25 years. 
Labor Market Developments 
Labor  market  developments  in  1979 
generally  paralleled  the  performance  of 
economic  activity,  with  employment  growth 
slowing in the first  half  and strengthening  in 
the third  quarter.  Total  employment,  which 
had grown steadily for 15 quarters through the 
first quarter of 1979, fell slightly in the second 
quarter,  and  the overall  employment-popula- 
tion  ratio  also  declined.  Payroll  employment 
growth,  which  maintained  its  post-recession 
average growth rate in the first quarter, slowed 
significantly in the second quarter. Labor force 
growth showed no change in the second quarter 
following  rapid  expansion  in  the  year's  first 
three months. Consequently, the growth rate of 
the labor force  in  the  first  half  of  1979  was 
considerably below the growth  attained earlier 
in  the expansion  period.  These movements  in 
employment and labor force growth resulted in 
virtual  stability  of  the  overall  unemployment 
Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City rate  in  the  first  half  of  1979,  following  14 
quarters of steady decline. 
As  was  the  case  with  economic  activity, 
however,  total  employment  rebounded  in  the 
third  quarter and  the employment-population 
ratio moved upward again. Labor force growth 
continued  and  the overall  unemployment  rate 
remained  virtually  unchanged from  its  second 
quarter level. It may  be  noteworthy,  however, 
that disaggregation  of  the  overall  unemploy- 
ment rate shows increases  in  the third  quarter 
in  the  unemployment  rates  of  adult  men; 
married  men,  spouse  present;  and  full-time 
workers. 
Prices and Costs 
The rate of increase in the cost of  living,  as 
shown by changes in the Consumer Price Index 
for  All  Urban  Consumers  (CPI-U),  was 
considerably greater in the first nine months of 
1979 than in  the high  inflation  year  of  1978. 
The total CPI-U rose at an annual rate of  13.2 
per cent during the first three quarters of 1979. 
Large  boosts  in  the  prices  of  energy  items, 
particularly gasoline  and  fuel  oil,  contributed 
to the overall rise, as did the accelerating cost 
of shelter, especially the sharp rise in  the cost 
of financing, taxes, and insurance. Food prices, 
on  the other  hand,  rose  at substantially 
decreasing rates from  the first  quarter to the 
third quarter of the year. 
Other  measures  of  price  change  show 
patterns  of  movement  for  1979  somewhat 
different from the fairly steady rate of increase 
in  the  CPI-U.  Prices  of  finished  goods  at 
wholesale (including capital equipment as well 
as consumer  goods)  rose  more  rapidly  in  the 
third quarter (+I5 per cent) than in  the first 
half  of  the  year  (+I1  per  cent).  Consumer 
foods and energy prices both contributed to this 
pattern,  while the rate of  increase in  producer 
prices of capital goods declined  over the three 
quarters. Finally, the broadest measure of  price 
change-the implicit deflator for gross national 
product  (GNP)-rose  at  an  annual  rate  of 
about  8.9  per  cent  from  the  close  of  1978 
through  the  third  quarter  of  1979.  This 
measure  not  only  shows  a  somewhat  lower 
inflation  rate  than  either  the  CPI-U  or  the 
Producer Price Index (PPI), it also shows some 
deceleration  of the inflation rate from  9.3 per 
cent in the first quarter to 8.0  per cent  in  the 
third quarter of  1979. 
Changes  in  unit  labor  costs,  which  are 
composed of changes in compensation per hour 
and in  output per hour, are perhaps the most 
important  influence  on  changes  in  prices, 
reflecting  as they do changes  in  fundamental 
real  economic  forces.  The  annual  rate  of 
increase  in  unit  labor  costs  in  the  economy's 
nonfarm business sector through three quarters 
of 1979 (11.8 per cent) was considerably greater 
than in 1978 (7.9 per cent). The return to real 
output  growth  in  the  third  quarter  of  1979 
slowed  the first  half  declines  in  productivity, 
and slowed the rise  in  unit labor costs and  in 
prices  as  measured  by  the  deflator.  Labor 
compensation  payments,  as  measured  by 
compensation per hour in the nonfarm business 
sector or by average hourly earnings in  private 
nonfarm  industries,  have  remained  relatively 
stable through the first three quarters of  1979 
and as compared with 1978. 
A  three-quarter  pattern  of  slow  growth, 
decline, and  rebound  in  business  activity thus 
added  up to nine months of  general weakness 
for  the economy through September  1979.  At 
the  same  time,  however,  the  general  price 
level-however  measured-rose  at  an  excep- 
tionally rapid rate. 
FINANCIAL DEVELOPMENTS AND 
MONETARY POLICY IN 1979 
During most of 1979, the financial scene was 
dominated by rising interest rates, weakness of 
the  dollar  in  foreign  exchange  markets,  and 
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the monetary growth objectives of  the  Federal  spring and  summer  greatly  exceeded  the 
Reserve.  Federal Reserve's monetary growth rate ranges. 
Monetary Growth Objectives  Monetary  policymakers  became  increasingly 
and Experience  concerned, feeling that the excessive growth in 
In  developing  its  objectives  for  1979,  the 
Federal Reserve wanted to establish growth rate 
ranges for the monetary and  credit  aggregates 
that would be consistent with  moderate growth 
in  economic  activity  during  the  year  and  a 
reduction  in  inflationary  pressures  that  had 
begun to intensify in 1978. Early in the year, at 
its February meeting, the Federal Open Market 
Committee  (FOMC) established  a growth  rate 
range of  3 to 6 per cent for  MI, the narrowly 
defined money supply, for the period from the 
fourth  quarter  of  1978  through  the  fourth 
quarter  of  1979.'  Growth  ranges  were  also 
established  for  M2  and  M3,  broader  money 
the money supply, if allowed to continue, would 
add  to inflationary  pressures.  The rapid 
monetary  growth,  moreover,  was  contributing 
to weakness in  the dollar in  foreign  exchange 
markets.  The  dollar  had  strengthened  in  late 
1978  in  response  to  a  new  support  program 
introduced in November of that year. However, 
its foreign  exchange value dropped sharply  in 
January 1979, and, after recovering somewhat, 
began  declining  again  in June.  By  the end  of 
September,  the dollar's  value  had  declined  to 
the level  prevailing  in  October  1978,  prior to 
the  introduction  of  the  November  support 
package. 
supply  concepts,  and  for  bank  credit.  M2's  Policy Actions 
range was 5 to 8 per cent, and M3's  range was  The  decline  in  the  dollar's  value  and  the  6 to 9 per cent. The range for bank credit was  rapid  monetary  growth,  along  with  the  7.5 to 10.5 per  cent.  This set  of  growth  rate 
ranges was reconfirmed in  July at the FOMC's 
mid-year review of  monetary growth objectives. 
During the first  part of  1979,  the monetary 
aggregates  were  very  sluggish.  For  example, 
M1 actually declined in the first quarter of  the 
year  at an  annual  rate of  2.1  per  cent. (See 
Table  1.)  During  the  spring,  however, 
monetary  growth  accelerated  and  M1 grew  at 
an annual rate of  7.6  per  cent  in  the second 
quarter.  Even greater growth developed  in  the 
third quarter, with M1 increasing at a  rate of 
9.7 per  cent  in  the  three  months  ending  in 
September. 
1 The  range actually established  at  the  February  meeting 
for  M1  was  1%  to 4% per  cent. This range reflected an 
allowance for  the  impact  of automatic  transfer payments 
(ATS)  introduced  in  November  of  1978,  which  were 
expected  to reduce  Ml's growth  rate.  However,  it  subse- 
quently  became  evident  that  ATS  were  having a  smaller 
downward  impact  on  the  growth  of  M1  than  originally 
expected. Due to this smaller impact, Ml's range has been 
adjusted to 3 to 6 per cent. 
6  Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City acceleration of  inflation, led  the  Federal 
Reserve  to  adopt  an  increasingly  restrictive 
monetary  policy  during  the  year.  In  July  the 
discount rate was  raised, and further increases 
occurred  in  August and September.  Also,  the 
Federal  Reserve  took  actions  to  bring  about 
increases in  market interest rates.  Due in part 
to these  actions,  the  interest  rate on  Federal 
funds had increased from around 10 per cent in 
January to around 11 % per cent by  the end of 
September. Other short-term interest rates rose 
in  line with the Federal funds rate. Long-term 
rates also increased  during the July-September 
period.  (See Chart 1.) 
Despite  the  restrictive  monetary  policy 
actions  taken  in  the spring and  summer,  the 
monetary  and  credit  aggregates  continued  to 
grow rapidly, inflation continued to accelerate, 
and the dollar continued to weaken. Moreover, 
by  the  end  of  September,  the  economy  was 
showing  unexpected  signs of  strength.  Under 
these circumstances,  the  Federal  Reserve  felt 
that  additional  strong  policy  actions  were 
needed.  On  October  6,  the  Federal  Reserve 
increased the discount rate one full percentage 
point to 12 per cent, placed a marginal reserve 
requirement  of  8  per  cent  on  managed 
liabilities,  and  decided  to  adopt  a  different 
approach to conducting  monetary  policy. 
Under  the  new  approach,  which  may  be 
referred to as the reserve aggregate approach, 
greater  emphasis  is  placed  on  controlling  the 
availability of money 'and credit. 
When  the demand for  money  and  credit  is 
expanding rapidly, as it was in  early October, 
the new approach of controlling. the availability 
of  money and credit  will  place strong upward 
pressure on interest rates. Thus, interest  rates 
rose sharply following the October 6 monetary 
policy actions. (See Chart 1.) 
THE NEW APPROACH 
The  new  approach  to conducting  monetary 
policy  consists  essentially  of  three  steps.  The 
Chart 1 
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Economic Review  December 1979 first  step  is  to  establish  objectives  for  the 
behavior of money and credit. The second step 
is  to estimate  the  behavior  of  "reserve 
aggregates
w-such  as  member  bank  reserves 
and the monetary base-that will  be consistent 
with  achieving  the  monetary  objectives.  The 
third step is to undertake those monetary policy 
actions  that  will  bring  about  the  required 
behavior of the reserve aggregates. 
The  first  step  in  the  new  approach  is  the 
same  as  in  the  previous  approach.  In  both 
cases,  the  Federal  Open  Market  Committee 
establishes  target  growth  rate  ranges  for  the 
monetary  and  credit aggregates.  Thus,  at the 
October  6  meeting,  the  FOMC  reconfirmed 
the  targeted  ranges  for  1979  that  were  first 
announced in  February and confirmed in July. 
Estimating  the Required Behavior 
of  Reserve Aggregates 
The  second  step  of  the  new  approach- 
estimating the behavior of reserve aggregates- 
differs from the earlier approach, although the 
two  have common  elements.  Both  agree  that 
the  money  stock  is  affected  by  both  demand 
and  supply  factors.  The  earlier  approach- 
known  as  the  interest  rate  approach-is 
demand  oriented  and  relies  heavily  on  the 
concept of the demand for money. This concept 
refers to a relationship between the amount of 
money  demanded  (that  is,  the  amount  of 
money that households  and businesses want to 
hold) and  the variables,  such  as income  and 
interest  rates,  that  affect  the  amount 
demanded. Specifically,  the  interest  rate 
approach focuses  on  the  relationship  between 
interest  rates  and  the  demand  for  money. 
Estimating  the behavior  of  interest  rates  that 
will  be  consistent  with  achieving  monetary 
growth objectives is the second  element in  the 
interest rate approach. 
The  reserve  aggregate  approach  is  supply 
oriented and relies on the relationship between 
the amount of  money supplied  by  the  Federal 
Reserve  and  the  banking  system  and  the 
variables that determine the amount supplied. 
The relationship between the money supply and 
its  determinants  may  be  summarized  in  the 
following way: 
where  M  represents  the  money  stock,  R 
represents  a  reserve  aggregate,  and  m  is  a 
"money  multiplier." The  equation  indicates 
that the money supply is  affected  by  a  reserve 
aggregate and a money multiplier. Specifically, 
the  level  of  the  money  supply  is  equal  to  a 
reserve aggregate multiplied  by  the  level  of  a 
money multiplier. In terms of growth rates, the 
growth  rate  of  the  money  supply  is  equal 
(approximately) to the growth rate of  a reserve 
aggregate plus the growth  rate of a multiplier. 
That is: 
where  the  dots  over  the  variables  indicate 
growth rates. 
The  second  step  in  the  reserve  aggregate 
approach--estimating  the  required  level  or 
growth rate of reserve aggregates-is equivalent 
to estimating the expected  level or growth rate 
of  the  money  multiplier.  Thus,  the  required 
growth rate of a reserve aggregate is as follows:  .  .  R*=M*-~~, 
where M* is the targeted money supply growth 
rate, me  is  the expected  growth  rate  for  the 
money  multiplier,  and  R*  is  the  required 
growth rate for the reserve aggregate. 
The reserve aggregate approach requires that 
multipliers  be  estimated-either explicitly  or 
implicitly-for each money supply concept that 
is targeted and for each reserve aggregate that 
is controlled. For example, if  M1 and M2 are 
targeted  and  member  bank  reserves  and  the 
monetary base are controlled,  four multipliers 
would  be  estimated-the  MI-reserves  multi- 
Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City plier (ml~),  the MI-base multiplier (mlg), the 
M2-reserves multiplier (m2~),  and the M2-base 
multiplier (m2~).  In theory, if  the estimates of 
the money multipliers were  accurate, only one 
reserve  aggregate would  be  needed.  Since  the 
estimates  may  not  be  accurate,  the  monetary 
policy  authorities  may  wish  to  focus  as  a 
precaution on more than one measure. 
In  estimating  the expected  growth  rates  of 
the money multipliers and the required growth 
rates  of  the  reserve  aggregates,  the  Federal 
Reserve will likely find  it  useful to observe the 
past  behavior  of  these  variables.  A  review  of 
past  behavior  indicates  that  the  two  reserve 
aggregates-member  bank  reserves  and  the 
monetary base-have followed an upward trend 
over  the past  several  years.  Reserves  have  in- 
creased from $36.9 billion in the fourth quarter 
of 1974 to $41.4  billion in the third quarter of 
1979.  During  the  same  1975-79  period,  the 
monetary  base-which  includes  member  bank 
reserves  plus  currency  in  circulation  outside 
member  banks-rose  from  $106.5  billion  to 
$148.8  billion  (Chart  2).  The  reserve-money 
multipliers  also  increased  during  the  1975-79 
period. By the third quarter of 1979,  ml~  had 
increased  to  9.0  and  m2~  had  increased  to 
22.3.  The  M2-base multiplier  (m2g) also  in- 
creased,  rising  to 6.2  in  the  latest  quarter, 
while  mlg trended downward  in  the  1975-79 
period, declining to 2.5 in the third quarter of 
1979 (Chart 3). 
In  terms  of  growth  rates,  member  bank 
reserves increased at an annual average rate of 
2.3 per cent during the 1975-79  period,  while 
the monetary  base grew  at an average  rate of 
7.3 per cent. (See Table 2.) The reserve multi- 
pliers grew at rates of 3.7 per cent for ml~  and 
6.6 per cent for m2~.  The M2-base multiplier's 
growth  rate was 1.7  per  cent,  while  mlg de- 
clined  at  an average  annual  rate  of  1.1  per 
cent. 
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of  reserve  aggregates  would  be  greatly 
simplified  if  the money  multipliers  could 
reasonably be assumed to behave in the future 
as they have in the past. For example, suppose 
the growth rate of  ml~  is  estimated  to be the 
same in the fourth quarter of 1979 as it was on 
average during the 1975-79 period.  Under this 
assumption,  the  required  growth  rate  for 
reserves that would be consistent with achieving 
the  targeted  fourth  quarter  M1  growth  rate 
would  be equal to the targeted  rate minus 3.7 
per cent, the average  annual increase in  ml~ 
during the 1975-79 period. 
Policymakers,  of  course,  cannot  reasonably 
assume that the money multipliers will  behave 
in  the  future  as  they  have  in  the  past.  The 
growth  rates  of  the  multipliers  vary 
considerably.  Thus, during the 1975-79 period, 
the annual growth rate of  ml~  varied from 0.4 




Table 2.) The quarterly variation is even  more 
pronounced.  Over  the  past  four  quarters, for 
example, the growth  rate of  ml~  varied  from 
0.8 per cent in the first quarter of 1979 to 12.7 
per cent in the second quarter of the year. 
Due  to  the  variability  of  the  money 
multipliers,  policymakers  cannot  reasonably 
estimate  their  expected  future  behavior  by  a 
simple  reference  to  past  behavior.  The 
estimates must be based on an analysis  of  the 
economic and financial conditions that may be 
affecting the behavior of  the  multipliers. 
Nevertheless, a review of past behavior provides 
a useful starting point in the task of estimating 
the  likely  future  course  of  the  money 
multipliers. 
Controlling the Reserve Aggregates 
The third step in  the new  reserve aggregate 
approach  also  differs  from  the  interest  rate 
approach.  In  the  third  step  of  the  previous 
approach,  monetary  policy  actions  were 
directed  toward  bringing about predetermined 
levels of  interest rates, particularly the Federal 
funds  rate.  The  third  part  of  the  reserve 
aggregate approach  is  to undertake  monetary 
policy actions that will bring about the required 
growth rates of the reserve aggregates. Interest 
rates  are  allowed  to  vary,  within  limits 
established  by the FOMC,  in  accordance  with 
the demand for the reserve aggregates. 
Monetary  policy  actions  that  affect  the 
reserve aggregates include establishing  reserve 
requirements,  making loans to member  banks 
and  setting  the discount  rate on  these  loans, 
and undertaking open market operations. On a 
continuous  basis,  the  most  important 
instrument  for  controlling  the  reserve 
aggregates  is  open  market  operations,  which 
refers  to  the  buying  and  selling  of  U.S. 
Government  securities.  Purchases  of  securities 
by  the  Federal Reserve increase bank reserves 
and the monetary base, while sales of securities 
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of securities held by the Federal  Reserve is an 
important  determinant  of  the  reserve 
aggregates. Other things equal,  a  high  or low 
level of securities results in  a high or low  level 
of reserves and the base. 
The reserve aggregates  are also  affected  by 
member  bank  borrowings  from  the  Federal 
Reserve, as a high or low  level of borrowing is 
reflected  in a high or low  level of reserves and 
the base. In addition,  the level of  the reserve 
aggregates  depends  on  currency  outside  of 
member  banks and on  a  number of  technical 
factors such as Federal Reserve float.2 
In controlling the level and  growth rates of 
the  reserve  aggregates,  the  Federal  Reserve 
adjusts its holdings of securities to take account 
of  and,  if  necessary,  to offset  the  impact  of 
factors such  as currency  flows  and  float.  For 
example,  suppose  the  Federal  Reserve  wants 
reserves  and  the  base  to  remain  unchanged. 
Suppose  further  that  float  is  expected  to 
increase,  which  would,  if  not  offset,  cause 
reserves and the base to increase.  In this case, 
the Federal Reserve would  reduce  its  holdings 
of  securities,  thereby  offsetting  the impact  of 
float  and  preventing  the  reserve  aggregates 
from increasing. 
While  the Federal  Reserve  can, within 
reasonably precise  limits,  offset  the impact  of 
currency  flows  and technical  factors,  the 
System may not be able to offset member bank 
borrowing in the short run. For example, if the 
Federal  Reserve,  by  reducing  its  holdings  of 
securities,  tries to reduce  total  reserves  below 
the level that banks are required to hold, banks 
will  borrow  at the  discount  window  to  meet 
their  requirements.  The  increased  borrowing 
will  tend to offset the impact on  total reserves 
2 Currency outside of  member  banks  does  not  affect  the 
monetary base because the base includes such currency, as 
well as member bank reserves. 
and the base of  the reduction  in securities and 
may,  therefore,  prevent  the  Federal  Reserve 
from  bringing  about  a  reduction  in  total 
reserves. ' 
Due to the tendency for  borrowing to offset 
open  market  operations  during  any  short 
period  of  time,  such  as  a  week,  the  Federal 
Reserve  works  with  a  somewhat  longer  time 
horizon,  undertaking  to control  the  level  and 
growth  rates of  the  reserve  aggregates  over  a 
period  of  weeks  or  months.  In  adopting  a 
longer  time  horizon  for  total  reserves,  the 
Federal  Reserve  focuses  on  a  week-to-week 
basis  on  controlling  nonborrowed  reserves. 
Nonborrowed  reserves equal total reserves 
minus borrowing  and  represent  the portion  of 
total reserves that is  not borrowed  through the 
discount  window.  By  controlling  nonborrowed 
reserves on a week-to-week basis, the impact of 
borrowing  on  the  reserve  aggregates  can  be 
taken into account and offset over a  period  of 
weeks,  thereby  allowing  control  over  total 
reserves and the monetary  base over  a  longer 
time period. 
For  example,  suppose  the  Federal  Reserve 
wants total reserves to remain at a  given level 
during  a  certain  period  of  time.  Suppose 
further that during the first part of the period, 
required  reserves are  above  the given  level  of 
reserves. The Federd Reserve may respond  by 
holding nonborrowed  reserves below the level of 
required  reserves,  thereby creating a  potential 
shortage  of  reserves.  The  shortage  places 
upward  pressure  on  short-term  interest  rates, 
as  banks seek  to  meet  their  requirements  by 
buying  Federal  funds  and  selling assets  from 
The  tendency  for  borrowing  to  offset  open  market 
operations  is  especially  pronounced  under  the  system  of 
lagged  reserve accounting,  now  in  operation.  Under  this 
system, the amount of reserves that must be provided to the 
banking system to meet requirements is given for any week 
by  past deposit levels.  If the given amount  is not  provided 
through  provisions  of  nonborrowed  reserves,  banks  will 
borrow the remainder. 
Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City their investment  portfolios.  Also,  some  banks 
will  borrow  from  the  Federal  Reserve.  The 
borrowing provides the banking system with the 
total reserves needed to meet requirements and 
temporarily keeps total reserves above the level 
sought  by  the  Federal  Reserve.  At  the  same 
time,  though,  the  decline  in  bank  assets  and 
the  increase  in  interest  rates  will  begin  to 
reduce the level of bank deposits.  In turn, the 
reduction in bank deposits will reduce the level 
of  required  reserves,  thereby  allowing  the 
Federal  Reserve to maintain the given  level of 
total reserves. 
ECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL 
OUTLOOK FOR 1980 
Economic Outlook 
The  third  quarter  rebound  in  real  GNP 
seemed  to call  into  question  the  pronounce- 
ment of many analysts that a recession began in 
the  second  quarter  of  1979,  and  perhaps 
earlier.  A  true  recession  may,  however,  be 
identified  in  retrospect  even  if  it  contains  a 
quarter  of  real  growth.  Even  with  the  third 
quarter  rebound,  the  economy  has  shown 
very little real growth since the fourth quarter 
of  1978. Real GNP grew during the first three 
quarters of  1979  at an  annual  rate  of  about 
seven-tenths of one per cent.  A  view  that the 
economy  is  exceedingly  weak  and  recession- 
prone, and  perhaps actually in  a  recession,  is 
still supported by the behavior of most business 
indicators. 
The  outlook  for  1980  is  quite  similar: 
continued recessionary tendencies well  into the 
year, with the odds on economic activity falling 
somewhere in  a  range  from  mild  recession  to 
very  slow  real  growth.  The  absence  of 
prospective  strength  in  nearly  all  major 
spending sectors,  and  the moves  of  monetary 
policy toward restraint, seem to assure such an 
outcome. 
The limited data on  business  activity in  the 
fourth quarter of 1979 give signals of weakness. 
Weakening in the labor market is indicated  by 
a decline in October in  the number of persons 
employed,  and  a  rise  in  the  overall 
unemployment  rate to 6  per  cent. The rise in 
the  unemployment  rate  from  5.6  per  cent  in 
June is primarily attributable to an increase in 
the  number  of  job  losers.  Housing  starts  de- 
clined, and the increase in  personal income in 
October  again  lagged  behind  the  increase  in 
prices. Retail sales also fell sharply in October, 
primarily but not wholly due to a large decline 
in new automobile sales following good car sales 
statistics  related  to  company  sales  incentive 
programs.  Reflecting  the  drop  in  sales,  auto 
manufacturers have continued  to reduce  their 
output plans for the fourth quarter. Nor are the 
inflation  data  encouraging.  The  PPI  rose  a 
little  more  slowly  in  October  than  in  the 
preceding  two  months,  as  food  prices  edged 
down  slightly  and  energy  price  rises  slowed 
down somewhat. But the approximately 12 per 
cent  annual  rate  of  increase  in  the index  for 
October  indicates  that  inflation  continues  to 
move  ahead  on  a  broad  front,  in  spite  of 
modest improvement in food and energy prices. 
Actual  and  potential  weakness  appear  to 
permeate nearly all the major spending sectors 
of the economy. Although the level of activity of 
the housing industry has been surprisingly well 
maintained over recent months, it remains true 
that the residential construction sector has been 
a drag on  total  real output growth  for over a 
year.  Demand, well  maintained for some  time 
by  demographic factors and  the view  of  home 
ownership  as  a  hedge  against  inflation,  now 
appears to be softening. More importantly, the 
supply  of  funds for contruction  and  mortgage 
financing is being rapidly reduced as a result of 
the recent tightening of  monetary policy. How 
much  those  recent  changes  will  worsen  the 
outlook  for  housing  is  not  yet  clear,  but  few 
observers  believe  that the  total  decline  from 
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60 per cent slide that occurred in the previous 
housing cycle. 
Further weakness in  residential construction 
will  have  a  negative  influence  on  related 
industries, including furniture, appliances, and 
home goods of  all  kinds.  But  that  is  not  the 
only  reason  for  expecting  weakness  in  the 
personal consumption expenditures sector. 
Most importantly, household  income continues 
to be ravaged by  inflation,  leaving consumers' 
ability to buy in a weak state. Real disposable 
personal  income  fell  in  both  the second  and 
third  quarters  of  1979,  bringing  the  third 
quarter level to below that of the fourth quarter 
of 1978. No  rapid increase in disposable income 
is in sight. Moreover, there is small likelihood 
that  the  personal  saving  rate will  be  reduced 
further to support consumption  increases. 
Indeed,  the saving  rate is  more  likely to rise 
and thus provide another weakening  influence 
on  the  growth  of  consumer  spending  in  the 
months ahead. 
Nor is business fixed investment  expected to 
be a driving force in total real output growth as 
the economy moves into 1980. The most recent 
survey of  business  intentions to purchase  new 
plant and equipment in 1980 shows an increase 
of  9.5  per  cent  over  such  spending  in  1979. 
Adjustment  for  expected  inflation  leaves  real 
capital spending in 1980  virtually  unchanged. 
The  survey  was  taken  before  the  October  6 
actions of  the Federal Reserve, and investment 
plans may be scaled  back in the new  financial 
environment. Other indicators suggest that cut- 
backs  in  capital  spending  programs  were 
already  under  way  before  October.  For 
example,  manufacturers'  new  orders  for 
nondefense  capital goods industries  peaked in 
March  1979,  and  contruction  contracts  for 
commercial and industrial buildings peaked in 
February of this year. The combined  series on 
contracts and orders for  plant and equipment 
also peaked in March 1979. In spite of  a surge 
in  September  orders  for  nondefense  capital 
goods,  it  seems  unlikely  that  business  fixed 
investment will grow very rapidly in  the face of 
rates  of  utilization  of  existing  capacity  that 
have  fallen  significantly  since  spring  and  an 
expectation of sluggish demand. 
Although business inventories were kept in  a 
good relationship to sales during the expansion, 
the  pattern  of  a  substantial  increase  in 
inventories  in  the  second  quarter  and  a 
considerably smaller accumulation in the third 
quarter  suggests  that  an  adjustment  of 
inventories is under way. Continued weakening 
of sales would further emphasize such a cyclical 
inventory  correction,  making  inventory 
investment a source of weakness in  real output 
growth. 
The  picture  of  general  weakness  in  the 
private  domestic economy  is  not  likely  to  be 
much  improved  by  the  performance  of  net 
exports or government  purchases of  goods and 
services. Earlier optimism about relatively 
strong  foreign  demand  for  U.S.  goods  and 
services has succumbed to the impact of  higher 
world  energy  prices,  inflation,  and  an 
increasing priority given  to inflation  control by 
foreign  governments.  Thus,  in  spite  of  a 
reduced  U.S.  demand  for imports accompany- 
ing slow growth in this country, net exports will 
probably  not  add  much  stimulus  to  U.S. 
economic  activity.  Neither  are  government 
purchases  of  goods  and  services  likely  to 
contribute much to total output growth. 
If  the  various  spending  sectors  behave  as 
suggested  above,  the American  economy is  in 
for a period of significant weakness, which may 
well  be identified  in  retrospect as a  recession. 
In this period of slow  growth or actual decline 
in real output, the economy's margin of unused 
resources will  widen  and  unemployment  rates 
will  rise.  As  this  occurs,  there  will  be  a 
reduction in the upward pressure of demand on 
prices.  Experience and economic analysis both 
demonstrate that slow  economic  growth  (and, 
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extended  period of  time, to reduce  the rate of 
inflation.  The beginnings of  that amelioration 
of  inflation should become apparent in 1980. 
Financial Outlook 
Turning to the financial outlook,  a  number 
of factors will be affecting  interest rates in the 
period ahead. One very important factor will be 
the condition of  the economy, and the sluggish 
economy  will  be  a  factor  tending  to  reduce 
upward  interest  rate  pressures  in  the  period 
ahead. In addition  to the prospective strength 
of the economy,  another factor  in  the interest 
rate  picture  is  the  outlook  for  inflation-an 
important  factor  because  a  continuation  of 
inflation  at  the  current  high  level  would 
reinforce  and strengthen  the inflationary 
premium  in  interest  rates  and  would  work 
against  any  tendency  for  interest  rates  to 
decline. As mentioned, the weak economy may 
lead to some reduction in  inflationary pressures 
during the first part of next year. 
An additonal factor affecting interest rates in 
the  period  ahead  will  be the behavior  of  the 
nation's  money  supply.  If  the  money  supply 
continues to grow rapidly, the Federal Reserve 
will  likely  reduce  further  the  availability  of 
reserves to the banking system, which will lead 
to further  upward  pressures on  interest  rates. 
The growth  rate of  the  money  supply  may  of 
course  moderate  in  the  months  ahead.  A 
moderation  would  be expected  to accompany 
the sluggish economy and any  deceleration  in 
the rate of inflation that may develop. 
Finally,  the  trend  in  interest  rates  in  the 
period  ahead  will  be  influenced  by  the 
performance  of  the  dollar  in  the  foreign 
exchange markets. Any marked and significant 
weakness  in  the  dollar  could  result  in  some 
additional firming in interest rates. 
Bringing  together all  these factors  that will 
be  affecting  credit  conditions  in  the  period 
ahead-monetary  policy,  the  behavior  of  the 
supply of  money, inflation, the dollar, and the 
economy-what  is  the  probable  outlook?  A 
reasonable  assessment  is  that  at  some  point 
during  the  period  ahead,  interest  rates  may 
stabilize and, perhaps, begin to decline.  If the 
economy weakens further in  the period  ahead 
and if the rate of price inflation decelerates, the 
demand  for  money  and  credit  may  begin  to 
grow  less  rapidly.  In  this  event,  the  Federal 
Reserve's efforts to maintain moderate growth 
in  the  availability  of  money  would  be 
accompanied  by  a lowering of interest rates. 
Regardless of  whether interest  rates increase 
further  or  decline  in  the  months  ahead,  any 
permanent decline in interest rates depends on 
bringing inflation  under control.  Moreover,  in 
the  long  run,  the  health  of  the  economy 
depends  on  success  in  the  fight  against 
inflation. Thus, it is important that the Federal 
Reserve  continue  its  efforts  to  gain  effective 
control over the growth of  money and credit. 
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